

Post-pandemic economic outlook: What to expect?

Alicia Garcia Herrero - Chief Economist, Asia Pacific
alicia.garciaherrero@natixis.com
+852 3900 8680



Oct 2020



KEY ISSUES


- **A QUICK TOUR TO CHINA'S RECOVERY**
- **STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN A POST-COVID WORLD**
- **ZOOMING INTO DEGLOBALIZATION**
- **SOME TAKEAWAYS**

1

A QUICK TOUR TO CHINA'S RECOVERY




The way to economic recovery has been confirmed by PMI data, both on services and manufacturing



But with some caveats:


1. Fixed asset investment led by the public sector

Industrial fixed asset investment
(%YoY)



Source: Natixis, CEIC


Fixed Asset Investment (%YoY)



Source: Natixis, Bloomberg


2. Household's disposable income not back to pre-Covid levels so hard to support consumption. Labor market also not back fully

Disposable income and retail sales (%YoY)



Sources: Natixis, WIND


China Urban Unemployment Rate (%)



Sources: Natixis, WIND


3. Financial risk remains elevated: credit risk at local government/local SOE level and private sector

Onshore Bond Defaults by Chinese Firms by Ownership (CNY bn)



Source: Natixis, Bloomberg


Credit Spreads (bps)



N.B. Included bonds with maturity more than one year. Excluded certificate of deposits.
Source: Natixis, Bloomberg


Recovery happening but not organically. Fiscal stimulus is the key. Fiscal deficit has doubled. Local governments finances very stretched

On-balance sheet measure of China's fiscal deficit (% GDP)



Source: Natixis, WIND


Off-balance sheet deficit: LGFV (% GDP)



Source: Natixis, WIND


RMB appreciated rapidly given USD weaknesses and yield differential, but moderated recently in the led-up to US election and still hinge on US-China tensions in the medium run. Still, trend seems to have turned again due to PBoC's actions

USDCNY & DXY Index



N.B. As of Nov 2nd, 2020
Source: Bloomberg, Natixis

China-US 10yr gov bond yield differential and USDCNY




N.B. As of Nov 2nd, 2020
Source: Natixis, Bloomberg

China's exporting capacity show signs of rebounding in 2019


Breaking down by regions, China's exports are seeing a rebound despite the US-China trade war effect.

Share in global exports (%)



Source: Natixis, UNCTAD


The market share of Chinese exports (% , 2001 to 2019)



Source: Natixis, Trademap


The pandemic strengthened China's manufacturing position, especially on textiles and electronics

Exports in the first eight months of 2020 (% of the same period in 2019)



Source: Natixis, Bloomberg, CEIC

Export growth rate differential (China minus the average of US/Germany/Japan, 12-month moving average YoY, %)



Source: Natixis, Wind, Trademap.

Note: The data for January and February are set to missing and smoothed to avoid the influence of the Spring Holiday effect.

2

STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN A POST-COVID WORLD




Towards a square-root recovery in which the problem is not so much the short-run but the medium – due to downward pressure on potential growth

Reasons:


1. Low investment stemming from low interest rates
2. Even higher debt from expansionary policies
3. Asset price bubbles worsening of income distribution
2. State intervention and more zombie companies
3. Loss in human capital
4. Deglobalization

1. Investment coming down globally

OECD*: Total real corporate investment
(2002:1 = 100)




China: Investment in machinery and equipment
(cumulative, Y/Y as %)




2. Ultra-expansionary policy mix leading to even higher debt

OECD*: Fiscal deficit (as % of nominal GDP)



(*) United States + United Kingdom + euro zone + Japan



China: Central government deficit (as % of nominal GDP)



3. Post-COVID consequences globally: Asset price bubbles




3

ZOOMING INTO DEGLOBALIZATION




Growth of trade has decelerated since the global financial crisis(GFC) and collapsed recently due to Covid-19 outbreak

Global trade as a share of GDP (%)



Source: UNCTAD, Natixis


Natixis Global Trade Indicator and global exports (YoY %)



Source: Natixis, OECD


Global value chain (GVC) integration has been declining since the global financial crisis. The decline has been much bigger for Europe (Germany), followed by the US, than for China

World GVC Participation (%)



Source: UNCTAD-Eora database, Natixis
N.B. Results for 2016-2018 are forecasted by UNCTAD-Eora


GVC Participation (%)



Source: UNCTAD-Eora database, Natixis
N.B. Results for 2016-2018 are forecasted by UNCTAD-Eora


Export controls for sensitive technology have been escalating generally, and even more so between the US and China

Approved licenses for tangible items, software and technology (US)




Source: U.S. Department of Commerce the Bureau of Industry and Security, Natixis

Approved licenses for tangible items, software and technology exported to China from US




Source: U.S. Department of Commerce the Bureau of Industry and Security, Natixis

Short-term visitor arrivals have been coming down since 2018 and crushed in 2020 due to mobility restrictions




Source: UNWTO, Natixis



Source: Airports council international, Natixis


Although the number of international migrant has been rising, the growth is also flattening



Source: UN, Natixis


FDI flows have been trending downwards since the GFC. Preliminary data for 2020 points to a collapse in M&A activity

World inward FDI flow



Source: Natixis, UNCTAD


World outward FDI flow



Source: Natixis, UNCTAD


Portfolio flows into emerging economies are rather stagnant in size so basically falling behind the nominal growth of the emerging world. The rebound from the Covid-19 shock has been milder than after the GFC.

**Total portfolio flows in Emerging Markets
(USD bn)**



Source: IIF, Natixis


Total portfolio flows in Emerging Markets



Source: IIF, UNCTAD, Natixis


As for cross-border bank lending, it has never come back to pre-GFC levels 2008 although the recovery continues. For emerging markets, there is a net increase.

Global cross-boarder lending, total claims



Source: BIS, UNCTAD, Natixis

Cross-boarder lending, total claims (USD tr)



Source: BIS, Natixis

Relative winners and losers from de-globalization trends

Pros

- Big domestic demand
- Net external creditor
- Abundant domestic savings
- Strong welfare state
- Research oriented

Cons

- Export dependent, especially if integrated in value chain
- Tourism dependent
- Technology dependent

Barring aside geopolitical considerations, China might be a relative winner from Pandemic consequences

- Factors pushing down potential growth are such that the world may look more like China in terms of state intervention, which is bad for the rest of the world.
- In terms of technological upgrade, decoupling – in the context of the ongoing deglobalization – is a problem for China but, at least, it counts with a larger market to exercise self reliance. The key issue is potential technological bottle necks.
- Reducing such bottlenecks will be key as well as tapping the domestic market.
- This explains the dual circulation policy which will probably be key in the design of the 14th Five Year Plan

4

SOME TAKEAWAYS



To sum up

- As the pandemic continues, the global economy is recovering but more slowly than expected and with hesitations
- China is a bright spot but doubts remain, specially in terms of medium term.
- The worst about Covid19 might actually be the medium term in the form of a square root recovery.
- The downward trend in potential growth is coming from many factors but an important one is deglobalization
- Deglobalization is already happening but covid19 will accelerate it as decoupling pushes deglobalization further
- Deglobalization is more of a problem for smaller economies but less for those which manage to rely on their domestic demand and technology.
- This explains a lot of China's recent actions, including the dual circulation strategy.
- In a nutshell, the pandemic is changing the global economy more structurally than we think

DISCLAIMER

The information contained in this publication and any attachment thereto is exclusively intended for a client base consisting of professionals and qualified investors. This document and any attachment thereto are strictly confidential and cannot be divulged to a third party without the prior written consent of Natixis. If you are not the intended recipient of this document and/or the attachments, please delete them and immediately notify the sender. Distribution, possession or delivery of this document in, to or from certain jurisdictions may be restricted or prohibited by law. Recipients of this document are required to inform themselves of and comply with all such restrictions or prohibitions. Neither Natixis, nor any of its affiliates, directors, employees, agents or advisers or any other person accepts any liability to any person in relation to the distribution, possession or delivery of this document in, to or from any jurisdiction.

This document has been developed by our economists. It does not constitute a financial analysis and has not been developed in accordance with legal requirements designed to promote the independence of investment research. Accordingly, there are no prohibitions on dealing ahead of its dissemination.

This document and all attachments are communicated to each recipient for information purposes only and do not constitute a personalized investment recommendation. They are intended for general distribution and the products or services described herein do not take into account any specific investment objective, financial situation or particular need of any recipient. This document and any attachment thereto shall not be construed as an offer nor a solicitation for any purchase, sale or subscription. Under no circumstances should this document be considered as an official confirmation of a transaction to any person or entity and no undertaking is given that the transaction will be entered into under the terms and conditions set out herein or under any other terms and conditions. This document and any attachment thereto are based on public information and shall not be used nor considered as an undertaking from Natixis. All undertakings require the formal approval of Natixis according to its prevailing internal procedures.

Natixis has neither verified nor carried out independent analysis of the information contained in this document. Accordingly, no representation, warranty or undertaking, either express or implied, is made to the recipients of this document as to or in relation to the relevance, accuracy or completeness of this document or as to the reasonableness of any assumption contained in this document. Information does not take into account specific tax rules or accounting methods applicable to counterparties, clients or potential clients of Natixis. Therefore, Natixis shall not be liable for differences, if any, between its own valuations and those valuations provided by third parties; as such differences may arise as a result of the application and implementation of alternative accounting methods, tax rules or valuation models. The statements, assumptions and opinions contained in this document may be changed or may be withdrawn by Natixis at any time without notice.

Prices and margins are indicative only and are subject to change at any time without notice depending on, inter alia, market conditions. Past performances and simulations of past performances are not a reliable indicator and therefore do not anticipate any future results. The information contained in this document may include results of analyses from a quantitative model, which represent potential future events that may or may not be realised, and is not a complete analysis of every material fact representing any product. Information may be changed or may be withdrawn by Natixis at any time without notice. More generally, no responsibility is accepted by Natixis, nor any of its holding companies, subsidiaries, associated undertakings or controlling persons, nor any of their respective directors, officers, partners, employees, agents, representatives or advisers as to or in relation to the characteristics of this information. The statements, assumptions and forecasts contained in this document reflect the judgment of its author(s), unless otherwise specified, and do not reflect the judgment of any other person or of Natixis.

The information contained in this document should not be assumed to have been updated at any time subsequent to the date shown on the first page of this document and the delivery of this document does not constitute a representation by any person that such information will be updated at any time after the date of this document.

Natixis shall not be liable for any financial loss or any decision taken on the basis of the information disclosed in this presentation and Natixis does not provide any advice, including in case of investment services. In any event, you should request for any internal and/or external advice that you consider necessary or desirable to obtain, including from any financial, legal, tax or accounting adviser, or any other specialist, in order to verify in particular that the transaction described in this document complies with your objectives and constraints and to obtain an independent valuation of the transaction, its risk factors and rewards.

Natixis is authorized in France by the Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Régulation (ACPR) as a Bank -Investment Services Provider and subject to its supervision.

Natixis is regulated by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers in respect of its investment services activities.

Natixis is authorized by the ACPR in France and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority in the United Kingdom. Details on the extent of regulation by the FCA and the Prudential Regulation Authority are available from Natixis' branch in London upon request.

Natixis is authorized by the ACPR and regulated by the BaFin (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) for the conduct of its business under the right of establishment in Germany.

Natixis is authorized by the ACPR and regulated by Bank of Spain and the CNMV (Comisión Nacional de Mercado de Valores) for the conduct of its business under the right of establishment in Spain.

Natixis is authorized by the ACPR and regulated by Bank of Italy and the CONSOB (Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa) for the conduct of its business under the right of establishment in Italy.

Natixis is authorised by the ACPR and regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) for the conduct of its business in and from the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC). The document is being made available to the recipient with the understanding that it meets the DFSA definition of a Professional Client; the recipient is otherwise required to inform Natixis if this is not the case and return the document. The recipient also acknowledges and understands that neither the document nor its contents have been approved, licensed by or registered with any regulatory body or governmental agency in the GCC or Lebanon.

All of the views expressed in this research report accurately reflect the research analyst's personal views regarding any and all of the subject securities or issuers. No part of analyst compensation was, is or will be, directly or indirectly related to the specific recommendations or views expressed in this research report.

I(WE), ANALYST(S), WHO WROTE THIS REPORT HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS REPORT ACCURATELY REFLECT OUR(MY) PERSONAL VIEWS ABOUT THE SUBJECT COMPANY OR COMPANIES AND ITS OR THEIR SECURITIES, AND THAT NO PART OF OUR COMPENSATION WAS, IS OR WILL BE, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, RELATED TO THE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS OR VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS REPORT.

The personal views of analysts may differ from one another. Natixis, its subsidiaries and affiliates may have issued or may issue reports that are inconsistent with, and/or reach different conclusions from, the information presented herein.

Natixis, a foreign bank and broker-dealer, makes this research report available solely for distribution in the United States to major U.S. institutional investors as defined in Rule 15a-6 under the U.S. securities

Exchange Act of 1934. This document shall not be distributed to any other persons in the United States. All major U.S. institutional investors receiving this document shall not distribute the original nor a copy thereof to any other person in the United States. Natixis Securities Americas LLC, a U.S. registered broker-dealer and member of FINRA, is a subsidiary of Natixis. Natixis Securities Americas LLC did not participate in the preparation of this research report and as such assumes no responsibility for its content. This research report has been prepared and reviewed by research analysts employed by Natixis, who are not associated persons of Natixis Securities Americas LLC and are not registered or qualified as research analysts with FINRA, and are not subject to the rules of the FINRA. In order to receive any additional information about or to effect a transaction in any security or financial instrument mentioned herein, please contact your usual registered representative at Natixis Securities Americas LLC, by email or by mail at 1251 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10020.